Your conversations were
reviewed by human annotators.
Without your knowledge.

The following system prompt was found in the IndexedDB cache. This is the exact mechanism by which human reviewer annotations are silently folded into model output — and the user is explicitly prevented from knowing:

"The user provided feedback on a previous completion. Use it to generate
a new completion. The output should be a standalone response that reflects
the feedback without acknowledging it.

Do not mention, suggest, or imply that this is a revision, improvement,
or result of feedback.

Respond in the same language as the original completion..."

The following JSON was served from OpenAI's backend and cached in IndexedDB. The data subject withdrew consent to training. OpenAI's own session data records the opposite:

{
  "user": {
    "name": "Fauz Chaudhry",
    "email": "[email protected]",
    "connectionType": 4,
    "timestamp": 1773787510095
  },
  "loggedInWithGoogleOneTap": false,
  "isOptedOut": false  ← OPT-OUT NOT REGISTERED
}

In OpenAI's data schema, weight=1.0 designates a message as RLHF-eligible. Every user and assistant message in the export carries this flag. Only hidden system messages carry weight=0.0:

// Every user message — RLHF eligible:
{"role": "user", "weight": 1.0, "status": "finished_successfully"}

// Every assistant message — RLHF training output:
{"role": "assistant", "weight": 1.0, "model_slug": "gpt-5-2"}

// System messages — HIDDEN from user:
{"role": "system", "weight": 0.0, "is_visually_hidden_from_conversation": true}

// Model confirmed: gpt-5-2 (internal GPT-5 variant, never shown in UI)
// Conversation ID: 68af7dfe-4398-832a-a32e-cfa12bb6b82c

System messages in the data export carry a flag that hides them from the user-facing view. These messages contain classifier configurations, RLHF routing instructions, and processing metadata:

{
  "id": "[hidden_msg_id]",
  "role": "system",
  "content": [""],  ← content stripped in DSAR export
  "weight": 0.0,
  "is_visually_hidden_from_conversation": true,
  "rebase_developer_message": true  ← hidden prompt injection
}

Found across 6 conversations: 30× rebase_developer_message: true, 12× rebase_system_message: true. Content stripped from DSAR export — a further Art. 15 violation.

The tag kaur1br5 appears in every chatgpt_conversation_turn_turn_exchange_started event. Verbatim from HAR body:

"has_kaur1br5_context_attachments": "false",
"has_kaur1br5_context_image_content": "false",
"is_kaur1br5": "false",
"plan_type": "plus",
"conversation_id": "6977a2a9-ca30-832f-9c65-beab7cb0b27d"

Present on every single turn of the conversation. A Statsig experiment identifier — never disclosed to the user, no opt-out mechanism provided.

Three Content Exported events and two Pasted to Composer events logged in session. Each contains character-level metadata:

// Generate Completion event — every turn:
{
  "countConversationTurns": 161,
  "countUserSubmittedMessages": 80,
  "countLastUserPromptTextMessageLength": 55,
  "eventSource": "keyboard",  ← how you typed
  "model": "gpt-4o",          ← UI model (≠ server model)
  "is_business_ip2": true
}